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A. Central Valiev Project Improvement Act of 1992.
"The Secretary [of the Interior], immediately upon enactment 
of this title, shall operate the Central valley Project to 
meet all obligations under state and federal law, including 
but not limited to the federal Endangered Species Act . . . 
and all decisions of the California State Water Resources 
Control Board establishing conditions on applicable licenses 
and permits for the project. The Secretary, in consultation 
with other State and Federal agencies, Indian tribes, and 
affected interests, is further authorized and directed to:
* * *
I. THE WATER QUALITY REQUIREMENTS
(2) upon enactment of this title dedicate and manage 
800,000 acre-feet of Central Valley Project yield for the 
primary purpose of implementing the fish, wildlife, and 
habitat restoration purposes and measures authorized by [the 
Act]; to assist the State of California in its efforts to 
protect the waters of the San Francisco Bay/Sacramento-San 
Joaquin Delta Estuary; and to help meet such obligations as 
may be legally imposed upon the Central Valley Project under 
state or federal law following the date of enactment of this 
title, including but not limited to additional obligations 
under the federal Endangered Species Act." CVPIA § 3406(b) .
B. The Endangered Species Act.
"[The Bureau of] Reclamation's declaration of available supplies 
for water year 1993 is as follows:
CONTRACTORS PERCENT SUPPLY
Agricultural contractors north of the Delta 100
Agricultural contractors south of the Delta 50
Urban contractors south of the Delta 100
Urban contractors south of the Delta 75*
Wildlife refuges north of the Delta 100
Wildlife refuges south of the Delta 75
Fish and Wildlife 100
Sacramento River water rights holders and 100
San Joaquin River exchange contractors 
* Percentage of historic use.
The forecasted operations meet Endangered Species Act 
requirements and the requirements of Public Law 102-575 (the 
Central Valley Project Inprovement Act) . Two conditions 
influencing the availability of water for CVP contractors are the 
cumulative effects of 6 previous years of dry conditions and the 
practical and regulatory limits of moving water to CVP facilities 
south of the Delta under the current conditions."
Central Valley Project Water Supply for 1993, April 7, 1993.
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II. THE LAW
A. The Fifth Amendment.
"No person shall . . .  be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation."
B. Madera Irrigation District v. Hancock, 985 F.2d 1397, 1400 
(9th Cir. 1993).
"Congress can change federal policy, but it cannot 
write on a blank slate. The old policies deposit a moraine 
of contracts, conveyances, expectations and investments.
Lives, families, businesses, and towns are built on the 
basis of old policies. When Congress changes course, its 
flexibility is limited by those interests created under the 
old policies which enjoy legal protection. Fairness toward 
those who relied on continuation of past policies cuts 
toward protection. Flexibility, so that government can 
adapt to changing conditions and changing majority 
preferences cuts against. Expectations reasonably based 
upon constitutionally protected property rights are 
protected against policy changes by the Fifth Amendment.
Those based only on economic and political predictions, not 
property rights, are not protected."
C. Horowitz v. United States. 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925).
" It has long been held . . .  that the United States when sued as 
a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the 
performance of the particular contract resulting from its public 
and general acts as a sovereign."
III. THE CASES
A. Westlands Water District v. United States. No. CV-F-93-5327 
OWW (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Calif.).
1. 50% reduction in water service to agricultural 
contractors south of the Delta, based on the Bureau of 
Reclamation's compliance with ESA and the CVPIA. This 
reduction occurred during a 150% of normal water year.
2. Fish, Wildlife & Habitat Restoration Fund Surcharge of 
$6 per acre foot for irrigation water and $12 per acre 
foot for M&I water. See CVPIA § 3407(d) (2) .
3. Alleged contract rights to water service of a fixed 
quantity and at a fixed price:
a. Westlands Contract:
Article 3 (f): "The right to the beneficial use of 
water furnished to the District pursuant to the terms
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of this contract and any renewal hereof shall not be 
disturbed so long as the District shall fulfill all of 
its obligations under this contract and any such renewal."
Article 11 (a): "There may occur at times during any 
year a shortage in the quantity of water available for 
furnishing to the District through and by means of the 
Project, but in no event shall any liability accrue 
against the United States or any of its officers, 
agents, or employees for any damage, direct or 
indirect, arising from a shortage on account of errors 
in operation, drought, or any other causes. . . . "
Article 26: "In the event that the Congress of the 
United States repeals the so-called excess-land 
provisions of the Federal reclamation laws, Articles 
23, 24, and 25 of this contract will no longer be of 
any force or effect, and, in the event that Congress 
amends the excess-land provisions or other provisions 
of the Federal reclamation laws, the United States 
agrees, at the option of the District, to negotiate 
amendments of appropriate articles of this contract, 
all consistently with the provisions of such repeal or 
amendment."
b. Shortage Provisions of the Other ..San Luis Unit Contracts:
"In its operation of the Project, the United States 
will use all reasonable means to guard against a 
condition of shortage in the quantity of water 
available to the Contractor pursuant to this contract. 
Nevertheless, if a shortage does occur during any year 
on account of drought, or other causes which, in the 
opinion of the Contracting Officer are beyond the 
control of the United States, no liability shall 
accrue against the United States or any of its 
officers, agents, or employees for any damage, direct 
or indirect, arising therefrom . . . ."
4. Remaining terms of the contracts are between 9 and 15 
years.
5. The San Luis Unit contractors--the Westlands, San 
Benito, San Luis, and Panoche Water Districts--have 
claimed that the United States has breached their 
water service contracts in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment by operating the CVP to conply with ESA and 
the CVPIA.
6. On February 10, 1994, Judge Oliver W. Wanger granted 
motions to dismiss Westlands' due process and takings 
claims, but denied motions to dismiss the Fifth 
Amendment claims of the other San Luis Unit plaintiffs.
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B. Peterson v. Department of the Interior, 899 F.2d 799 (9th 
Cir. 1990).
1. Challenge to constitutionality of the "Hammer Clause"
of the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. 43 U.S.C. §
390cc(b).
2. The Reclamation Act of 1902.
a. Jeffersonian ideal of agrarian economy.
b. Small, family farms--160 acre limitation.
c. Subsidized water.
3. Leased lands loophole:
"By 1981, only 23% of the land receiving federal 
reclamation project water was farmed in operations of 
160 acres or less. Three percent of the farming 
operations receiving reclamation benefits controlled 
30% of all of the irrigated lands in the program. The 
largest farms, which comprised 20% of the irrigated 
acreage in the program, averaged 3,721 irrigable 
acres. The greatest individual beneficiaries of the 
practice of unlimited leasing were large corporate 
farming operations located in California's San Joaquin 
Valley." Peterson, 899 F.2d at 805.
"The federal subsidy to these large farming operations 
was enormous. The contract price of water delivered 
to the Water Districts ranged from $2.00 to $7.50 per 
acre foot. In contrast, the actual cost to the United 
States of providing this water was between $8.43 and 
$55.61. The value of the water subsidy provided to 
Southern Pacific Land Company alone was estimated at 
$6 million per year." Id.
"By 1982, the Congressional Budget Office calculated 
that the United States would in the next five years 
spend roughly $3.8 billion on Bureau of Reclamation 
water projects, but would recoup only $275 million as 
a result of existing reclamation repayment policies." 
Id. at 804.
4. The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982.
a. 960 acre limitation for subsidized water.
b. Landholdings in excess of the new acreage 
limitation must pay full cost for project water.
c. Closure of leasing loophole: The RRA defines
landholding as the "total irrigable acreage of one or 
more tracts of land . . . owned or operated under a
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5. The Hammer Clause, 43 U.S.C. § 390cc(b) :
Contractors and recipients of project water must elect 
to amend their existing contracts to conform to the 
new acreage limitations and pricing provisions
- or -
effective April 12, 1987, they must pay "full cost" 
for all water supplied to landholdings of any kind in excess of 160 acres.
6. CVP contractors claimed that the Hammer Clause 
breached their contracts and therefore violated the 
due process and takings clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
7. The Court of Appeals held that the contractors did not 
have explicit contract rights to subsidized water for 
leased lands in excess of the 160 acre limitation.
8. The contracts provided, however, that no project water 
would be delivered to excess lands, which were defined 
as land "in excess of 160 acres held in beneficial 
ownership of any private individual."
Did the term "beneficial ownership" mean only fee 
title or all types of ownership of real property, 
including leasing arrangements? The United States, 
acting through the Bureau of Reclamation, had 
interpreted the term "beneficial ownership" to mean 
only fee interests. This interpretation would support 
the contractors' claims that they had a right to 
subsidized project water for leased lands m  excess of 
the 160 acre limitation on land owned in fee.
9. Nevertheless, the Court ruled against the plaintiffs' 
impairment of contract and Fifth Amendment claims.
10. Interpretational Principles:
"The first step in both due process and taking 
analysis is to determine whether there is a property 
right that is protected by the Constitution. * * *
"There is no question that the federal 
government, 'as sovereign, has the power to enter 
contracts that confer vested rights, and the 
concomitant duty to honor those rights.'"
Nonetheless, when interpreting the federal 
government's contractual agreements, we are guided by 
three paramount principles:
lease." 43 U.S.C. § 390bb(6).
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First, "'sovereign power, even when unexercised, 
is an enduring presence that governs all 
contracts subject to the sovereign's 
jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless 
surrendered in unmistakable terms.'" Thus, 
"contractual arrangements, including those to 
which a sovereign itself is party, 'remain 
subject to subsequent legislation' by the 
sovereign."
Second, governmental contracts "should be 
construed, if possible, to avoid foreclosing 
exercise of sovereign authority."
Third, governmental contracts should be 
interpreted against the backdrop of the 
legislative scheme that authorized them, and our 
interpretation of ambiguous terms or implied 
covenants can only be made in light of the 
policies underlying the controlling legislation."
Peterson, 899 F.2d at 807 (quoting Bowen Public 
Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, All 
U.S. 41, 52 (1986)).
11. The Court also rejected the plaintiffs' claim that a 
contract term that is commonly used in the CVP 
contracts waives Congress' sovereign power to change 
the law and to apply the new law to existing CVP 
contracts.
"In our view, the clause granting the Districts 
the option of renegotiating their contracts cannot 
reasonably be interpreted as a ' surrender [] in 
unmistakable terms' of the sovereign's power to make 
changes in the federal reclamation laws. Such an 
interpretation would do violence to the principle that 
government contracts should be construed, whenever 
possible, 'to avoid foreclosing exercise of sovereign 
authority. ' In light of this principle, we believe 
that a more reasonable interpretation of Article 21 is 
that it grants the Water Districts the option of 
renegotiating the terms of their contracts to conform 
to Congress's amendments to the excess land provisions 
of the reclamation law. This option does not, 
however, give the Water Districts the right to 
continue to receive reclamation water under the terms 
of the pre-existing contracts if those terms violate 
the newly amended law." Id. at 812.
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c. Madera Irrigation District v. Hancock. 985 F.2d 1397 (9thCir. 1993)
1. 1986 Amendment to the Federal Reclamation Laws, Pub.
L. No. 99-546, § 106, 100 Stat. 5050, 5052 (1986).
In all renewal contracts, CVP contractors must repay 
to the United States any accumulated deficit of O&M 
expenses not paid under their existing contracts.
2. The O&M deficit was caused by the use of long-term, 
fixed rate contracts and drastically increased O&M 
costs from the mid-1960's to present.
By 1986, the system-wide O&M deficit for the CVP was $38 million.
3. Madera has a permanent contract right to water service 
at rates that "shall not exceed charges to others than 
the District for the same class of water and service" 
within the Friant Unit of the CVP.
4. Madera claimed that the 1986 statute breached this 
contract right, because rates under Madera's renewed 
contract would include repayment of its accumulated 
O&M deficit and therefore would be higher than other 
Friant Unit contractors' rates, some of which have no 
O&M deficit. Madera alleged that this breach of 
contract violated both the due process and takings 
clauses of the Fifth Amendment.
5. The Court of Appeals rejected Madera's Fifth Amendment 
claims, concluding that Madera's contract rights were 
not sufficiently clear and categorical:
"Congress decided in the plainest terms to change 
its policy, so that instead of buying subsidized 
water, purchasers of the new water will have to pay 
its full operation and maintenance costs, plus an 
increment measured by the subsidy furnished to 
purchasers of the old water. We are unable to say 
that by the words, 'shall not exceed charges made to 
others than the District for the same class of water 
and service, ' the government's sovereign authority to 
charge more for water service with a higher operation 
and maintenance cost was ' surrendered in unmistakable 
terms.'" Madera, 985 F.2d at 1404.
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IV. EVALUATION OF THE PRESERVED SOVEREIGN POWER DOCTRINE
A. The Power to Tax.
1. CVPIA § 3407(d)(2)--The Restoration Fund Surcharge.
2. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 
(1982) .
a. Long-term coal leases at fixed royalty payments 
to the Tribe.
b. According to the contracts, "No change may be 
made in the rate of royalty or annual rental 
without written consent of the parties."
c. The Tribe subsequently enacted a severance tax.
d. The coal conpanies claimed that the tax violated 
their contract rights to fixed royalty payments 
and therefore was illegal.
e. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the coal 
companies' breach of contract claim. The Court 
applied the retained sovereignty principle and 
concluded that
B. Other Substantive Statutory Changes.
1. ESA and CVPIA § 3406 (b)--"The Regulatory Water
Shortage."
2. Separation of Powers.
a. Madera Irrigation District v. 985 F.2d
at 1407 (Hall, J., concurring): "It is doubtful
that the Secretary of the Interior could, by 
contract, waive the right of Congress to pass 
laws . . . ."
b. Transohio Savings Bank v. Director, Office of 
Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 621 (D.C. Cir. 
1992):
" [W]e assume without expressing a view that 
Congress might delegate to an agency the power to 
contract away Congress' regulatory power--though 
the Supreme Court has never considered such a 
congressional delegation.
"Even if such a delegation is permissible, 
however, Congress cannot be found to have 
delegated to an agency the power to preclude 
subsequent regulatory legislation unless the 
delegation was explicit. In the context of
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contracts entered into by administrative 
agencies, in other words, the [retained 
sovereignty] doctrine has two components: the 
contract relinquishes Congress' power to regulate 
only when (1) the agency, in the contract has 
unmistakably waived Congress' regulatory 
authority, and (2) Congress, in a statute, has 
unmistakably delegated to the agency the power to 
surrender Congress' regulatory authority."
3. Frustration of Congressional Purposes.
a. The contention that new laws may not be applied 
to existing contracts is a substantive due 
process claim. See Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v. 
Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789-90 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
b. Rejection of the retained sovereignty doctrine 
"would allow federal agencies to supplant 
congressional policymaking by contracting away 
Congress' power to regulate. . . . [A]gencies 
would be making laws not pursuant to 
congressional direction, but over Congress' 
objections. The framers, however, 'fully 
recognized that nothing would so jeopardize the 
legitimacy of a system of government that relies 
upon the ebbs and flows of politics to "clean out 
the rascals" than the possibility that those same 
rascals might perpetuate their policies simply by 
locking them into binding contracts.'"
Transohio, 967 F.2d at 622 (quoting United States 
Trust Co, v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 45 (1977) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting)) .
4. Public Resources and Public Rights.
a. Forced subsidies at amounts greater than the 
public's representatives have authorized.
b. Forced water deliveries at costs that the public 
has chosen not to bear--water pollution, _ 
declining fisheries, loss of wetlands and 
riparian habitat.
c. Forced transfers of public resources to private 
use that the public no longer supports.
C. Two Criticisms.
1. The "public" resources have been effectively converted
to private resources by the contracts in question.
By applying new laws to existing contract rights, the
United States has violated the proscription
articulated by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South
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Carolina Coastal Council, 112 U.S. 2886 (1992), that 
" [t]he state by ipse dixit may not transform private 
property into public property without compensation."
2. As the Court of Appeals stated in Madera, 985 F.2d at 
1401: "Too liberal an interpretation of the residual 
sovereign power of the government to override its 
contractual commitments would eviscerate the 
government's power to bind itself to contracts."
D. Responses.
1. These cases stand primarily for the proposition that 
the courts should scrutinize carefully the contract 
right asserted as a bar to the application of the 
amended law. The Fifth Amendment only protects 
"property," which is defined formally by the precise 
terms of the contracts and applicable law. It does 
not protect expectations or inferences that are not 
based on the express and unequivocal terms of the 
contracts.
This is consistent with the holding in Lucas that 
restrictions that "inhere in the title itself" may be 
enforced even if the result is the complete 
elimination of the value or benefits associated with 
the contract or real property in question. See 112 
U.S. at 2900.
2. If the contract has created property rights 
enforceable under the Fifth Amendment, a distinction
must be drawn between prospective and retrospective 
application.
As the Supreme Court observed in Public Agencies, 477 
U.S. at 51: "Congress' exercise of the reserved power 
has a limit in that Congress could not rely on that 
power to take away . . . the fruits [of the contract] 
already reduced to possession."
Prospectively, the "private rights" retain their 
public character insofar as the public is not 
constitutionally required to honor contractual 
requirements for future transfers of resources to 
private ownership that would conflict with the new 
law.
3. The concern that the retained sovereignty doctrine 
will impair the ability of the United States to enter 
into contracts ignores several important facts.
a. Many contracts and other licensed activities in 
the natural resources area embody federal 
subsidies--e.g., water service contracts, timber 
sales agreements, mineral leases, and grazing permits
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As the Supreme Court stated in Irrigation
District v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 296 (1958) 
(quoting Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill, 131 
(1942)), '"It is hardly lack of due process for 
the Government to regulate that which it 
subsidizes.'"
b. The parties to more traditional government 
contracts--those that are the products of arm's 
length negotiations— can take the risk of changes 
in the governing law into account in bargaining 
over the terms of the contracts.
c. Ultimately, this concern is more properly 
addressed to the Congress and the Executive.
V. CONCLUSION
The retained sovereignty doctrine may- be controversial, or even 
counterintuitive. It represents, however, a salutary means of 
ensuring that what Charles Wilkinson has called the "Lords of 
Yesteryear"— the predominantly developmental and exploitative resource 
policies of the General Mining Law, the Forest Service Organic Act, 
the Reclamation Act, and other laws— do not frustrate modem efforts 
to accommodate resource develop with contemporary values, embodied in 
contemporary laws, supported by contemporary scientific understanding.
VI. RELATED CASES OF INTEREST
Everett Plywood Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 723 (Ct. Cl. 1981) 
(timber sales contract— retained sovereignty doctrine not applied) .
Western Fuels-Utah, Inc. v. Lujan, 895 F.2d 780, 789-90 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (coal leases— retained sovereignty doctrine applied) .
f
Swanson v. Babbitt, 3 F.3d 1348 (9th Cir. 1993) (mining patent 
application--retained sovereignty doctrine not needed).
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